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Introduction 
Migration not only affects migrants themselves but also those left behind. Transnational studies 
have supplemented our understanding of migration populations by emphasizing the bi- and 
multi-directional routes that migrants take, and the spaces “over and beyond” national borders 
where they transact (Wahlbeck, 2002, p. 223; see also Fresnoza-Flot; Oliveira; Quereshi-Osella, 
this volume). In particular, this volume seeks to understand the challenges emerging from South–
South migration. 
This chapter examines the educational challenges of the middle portion of a more protracted 
path: that of South–South–North migration. That is, it examines how refugees who have fled 
their country of origin but remain in the global South fare in protracted refugee situations (PRS) 
when many of their camp co-residents have started to resettle in the global North. As the chapter 
lays out, refugee camps are semi-closed systems, where challenges to human and capital 
mobility pose specific problems in the education sector.  
Drawing on empirical research conducted in refugee camps in Thailand, a long-standing PRS 
where mass resettlement is currently taking place, as well as the literature on the economies of 
  
refugee camps, this chapter problematizes the issue of education for refugees left behind during 
mass resettlement. The first section delineates the particularities of PRS. The second section 
synthesizes the disparate literatures of refugee camp economies and closed political systems. A 
third section examines the effects of mass resettlement on education in refugee camps in 
Thailand. The paper concludes that, although resettlement benefits some refugees, it is important 
to understand the impact of resettlement on the education of those left behind in the semi-closed 
environment of refugee camps.  
<A>Protracted Refugee Situations and Mass Resettlement 
An estimated 7.2 million people currently reside in protracted refugee situations (PRS), defined 
as situations where refugees have lived “5 years or more after their initial displacement, without 
immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions” (UNHCR, 2009, p. 3; UNHCR, 
2010a, p. 14). PRS stem from root causes that are well-documented in the literature, including 
political and security issues (Adelman, 2008), social identity conflicts (Buck & Silver, this 
volume), and economic inequality (Castles, 2010). 
The international refugee regime has noted the gravity and persistence of the problems 
associated with PRS, but its concern for educating PRS populations is inconsistent. In the late 
2000s, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) convened meetings 
with high-level stakeholders on the subject of PRS, and UNHCR’s Executive Committee drafted 
and adopted a Conclusion on PRS in 2009, but the Conclusion only mentions education once, in 
the context of refugee access to basic services (UNHCR, 2009, p. 2). Experts have noted the 
need to address gaps in the education of refugees in protracted situations (Milner, 2011; Milner 
& Loescher, 2011) and agencies that do educational work with PRS populations have 
documented these gaps (see, for example, Oh, 2010).  
  
As has already been noted in the introduction to this volume, neighboring countries 
overwhelmingly bear the burden of hosting and providing protection for refugees; this is 
especially so in the context of PRS. In addition, populations that experience PRS reside almost 
exclusively in the global South, but the conflicts that produced these refugee situations very 
often find their roots in political and economic decisions made in the global North (Chimni, 
1998; Castles, 2003). It is thus perhaps not surprising that one of the institutional responses to 
PRS is the resettlement of refugees from initial countries of displacement to countries of the 
global North. Although resettlement represents the possibility of a durable solution for the 
relatively small number of refugees who are selected each year to be resettled—less than 80,000 
in 2010 (UNHCR, 2010b, p. 1)—there remains the enduring challenge of those refugees who are 
not resettled and remain in PRS.  
In situations where mass resettlement takes place—that is, in instances where UNHCR and 
resettlement countries choose to resettle large portions of particular refugee populations in a 
relatively short amount of time, such as refugees from Burma resettling from Thailand, or 
refugees from Bhutan resettling from Nepal—there is still the issue of populations “left behind.” 
There are several reasons for this: some refugees do not want to resettle, some are not permitted 
to resettle (because they are believed to be a security or health risk in potential countries of 
resettlement), and some are simply in the later batches of resettled populations, waiting 
(sometimes for years) as resettlement unfolds. Mass resettlement poses particular difficulties for 
populations left behind in PRS, especially in the education sector. In addition to creating 
discernible shifts in resources (goods, labor, and capital), mass resettlement diminishes student 
and teacher motivation and reduces the possibility for a healthy learning environment in refugee 
camp schools.  
  
<A>Conceptual Framework 
<B>Educating Refugees, Education in PRS, and Education in Closed Systems 
The small but growing literature on emergency education and refugee camp education has gained 
increasing theoretical traction. Of particular note are a few foundational pieces that observe the 
uneasy relationship that refugee situations create regarding education policy and implementation 
between states (ordinarily the purveyors of education within their own borders) and humanitarian 
agencies that take over this duty (Waters & LeBlanc, 2005; Zeus, 2011). Educated refugees in 
PRS do not and cannot play the same role as educated citizens simply by the nature of their 
impermanence in the host country, and this impermanence explains why international agencies 
and affiliated NGOs take over the role of education planning and thus become the surrogate 
state.  
In the broader migration literature, scholars have frequently turned to transnational concepts 
rooted in anthropology and sociology to inform the relationship between the international 
community that frequently directs humanitarian assistance (specifically, education aid) and the 
national, regional, and local stakeholders who have overlapping priorities and strategies. On the 
one hand, “inter/national” institutions share and vie for the resources and responsibilities of 
educating migrants and refugees (Bartlett & Ghaffar-Kucher, this volume), a point that 
preferences the power of the institutions themselves. On the other hand, by nature of their 
transnational resources (linguistic and cultural knowledge, for example), migrants and refugees 
are participants in “discretionary humanitarianism” (Fassin, 2011), the process that offers 
protection on a discretionary basis and serves to regulate and define migrant/refugee status. In 
the education sector, the extent to which initiatives for migrants and refugees have the potential 
  
to be “counter-hegemonic” is unclear, but it is certain that they serve populations who are 
anything but passive recipients (Buck & Silver, this volume). 
Another way to conceptualize PRS education is through understanding the provision of 
education (as well as other elements of humanitarian aid) as a means to count, control, and hold 
accountable refugee populations. There exists a significant tension between refugee protection 
and refugee administration (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Malkki, 1995). As a result, particularly in the 
camp environment, refugee schools serve dual purposes: to attend to the educational and 
psychosocial needs of youth (Baxter & Triplehorn, 2004) and to maintain control of a population 
that has been shown to be restless and potentially explosive (Evans, 2008). Schools thus mirror 
the larger camp economy, restricting mobility of labor and capital. Although camps are never 
entirely closed systems (Chambers, 1986; Demusz, 1998; Jacobsen, 2005), their restrictions 
make it fair to call camps “semi-closed systems” (the author’s term) by virtue of four elements 
relevant to education: (1) a highly limited supply of teachers and administrators; (2) a relatively 
immobile student body; (3) a severely limited flow of capital and other resources to camp 
schools; and (4) limited access to innovation, or, in the school context, curriculum reform.  
In Uganda’s refugee camps, Werker (2007) notes that policy distortions such as high 
transportation costs, limited information, and market size magnify the importance of (and 
dependency upon) the implementing agency, in this case, UNHCR and its operational partners. 
As a result, programs put in place by humanitarian agencies have a more significant impact than 
they would in a normal economy. Building on Werker’s work, this chapter proposes to explain 
the international humanitarian community’s actions by showing that it adopts strategies that 
circumvent or alleviate the difficulties of camps’ semi-closed systems by serving as a link to 
external host systems and economies. The following section details the restricted elements listed 
  
above and the ways in which agencies respond to and mitigate the refugee camps’ semi-closed 
systems. The subsequent section will illuminate these strategies empirically in the context of 
Thailand. 
 
<B>Limited Supply of Teachers and Administrators 
Writing about education in the context of resettlement, Pinson and Arnot (2007) note that, 
“surprisingly, given the high level of interest in the relationship between globalisation, 
citizenship and education, there … appears to have been little attention given to the implications 
of human mobility” (pp. 399–400). Even more striking is that there has been no consideration of 
mobility, or its lack, in PRS education, in which questions of globalization, citizenship, and 
education are even more salient. Yet the general lack of mobility of camp workers is at the heart 
of limited supply, particularly in the education sector. 
Several factors explain why the supply of teachers and administrators is limited in refugee 
camps. First, inherent in the nature of the refugee experience is the fact that camp residents come 
from an educational system that differs from the host country, in terms of accreditation, 
curriculum, and, frequently, language (Zeus, 2011). This difference clearly diminishes the 
number of host country teachers and administrators who are qualified and willing to work in 
camps. Second, the best-educated refugees often do not live in camps, but spend most of their 
time in urban areas. Where mobility exists, it is accessible for those best-educated refugees 
(Khawaja, 2003). In such PRS, this means that the ratio of educated individuals to the general 
population is smaller than in the country of origin, which has clear implications for the pool of 
people who can serve as teachers and administrators. Third, movement in and out of refugee 
camps is limited not only by official policies, but also by barriers to transportation and unofficial 
  
fines imposed by host country police or other security bodies (Werker, 2007). Thus, individuals 
from outside the camps who might otherwise be able to lend their expertise and experience to the 
education sector in refugee camps have several incentives not to do so.  
Given this limited supply, it is clear why outside agencies have stepped in to staff refugee camp 
education. International agencies and their operational partners provide training for camp 
teachers who are refugees themselves. Additionally, with relatively hefty resources and the 
occasional ability to negotiate the red tape of camp mobility restrictions, they can bring 
educators into the camps. It is not uncommon for people from the global North (of varying 
expertise) to volunteer or teach in refugee camps.  
 
<B>Relative Immobility of Student Body 
The same movement restrictions that immobilize teachers are relevant to a lesser extent for 
students in camp schools. Students have limited options within camps of choosing between 
schools, and, once they complete lower school levels, only a small proportion may be able to 
access higher education because there are few tertiary institutions available to refugees. The 
implications for those that remain are evident: just as in any economy where competition is 
negligible, there is little economic incentive for producers (educators) to improve their services. 
In larger economies, immobile student populations may encourage policies that differentiate 
between training a skilled and non-skilled workforce (Demange, Fenge, et al., 2008), but in 
refugee camps, the immobility of the student population can reinforce the host government’s lack 
of interest in educating the camp population. 
In the absence of a nation-state concerned with future human capital of refugee populations, 
humanitarian aid agencies step in to fill the education gap, raising important questions of 
  
governmentality that are central to this volume (see Bartlett & Ghaffar-Kucher, this volume; 
Buck & Silver, this volume; Fassin, 2011). As agencies replace the nation-state as a source of 
governance and governmentality, they redefine the functions of both teachers and students in at 
least two key ways. First, they address issues of accreditation, varied curricula, medium of 
instruction, and timing issues that arise because of the transnational nature of the student body. 
Second, they negotiate with authorities to permit students to study outside camps and provide 
schooling within the camps. Because of the presence of humanitarian agencies, in fact, a 
“multiplicity of options” has been noted for displaced students in some contexts who want to 
continue their education (Chelpi-den Hamer, 2011, p. 72), such as informal education, vocational 
training, and long-distance education. 
 
<B>Limited Flow of Capital 
Partially related to the mobility restrictions that camps experience, capital flow is limited, and, 
where it does exist, is more likely to move into informal economies of trade than into the 
education sector. Education systems rarely, if ever, benefit from host country taxation systems or 
the informal taxation of refugee camp populations by camp leaders or transnational warlords 
(Black & Koser, 1999, pp. 163–164). As a result, the camp-based refugee education sector has 
little independent economic base and must rely solely on UNHCR and implementing partners, 
whose contributions include the funding of schools, the provision of books and other supplies, 
and, where possible, stipends for teachers (UNHCR & WFP, 2006; JRS, 2010; Oh, 2010). Camp 
schools that function in the absence of humanitarian agencies demonstrate how critical is this 
infusion of capital; however, as underfunded as refugee camp schools may appear to be, they are 
  
usually a vast improvement over any possible education in settlement areas where humanitarian 
agencies have had no access (see, for example, HRW, 2007).  
<B>Limited Access to Innovation in Educational/Curricular Reform 
Just as closed economic systems lack innovation in the absence of incentives (for example, 
research and development is not well rewarded with the possibility of higher profits), the semi-
closed systems that characterize refugee camps discourage innovation because of a similar lack 
of incentives. In the context of education, the lack of incentives stems from the uncertainty of the 
resolution of PRS, making it difficult to develop original and creative ways to think about what 
students should learn and how they might put it to use in the future. Simply put, neither external 
education planners nor refugees themselves (as students or planners) know where they will be in 
the future, making systemic and curriculum design very difficult. Furthermore, and linked to the 
limited flow of capital, curricular reform is challenging in the absence of materials such as books 
and teaching supplies. The limitations of such curricular reform need to be placed in context, 
however. First, education in camps is preferable in many instances to no education in the home 
country. Second, as demonstrated in the subsequent paragraph, humanitarian agencies have 
developed numerous strategies that fill the gap of what might otherwise be limited educational 
reform.  
Humanitarian agencies seek to adapt and improve simply to survive institutionally (for example, 
Duffield, 1994). The pressure for constant innovation in the subfield of emergency education is 
no exception; the primary industry guidelines for humanitarian practice suggest innovative ways 
to link education and health (The Sphere Project, 2011) and, more specifically, the Inter-Agency 
Network for Education in Emergencies’ (INEE) Minimum Standards for Education: 
Preparedness, Response, Recovery (INEE, 2010) encourages improvements in teaching and 
  
learning through curriculum design, although it has been noted that not all changes lead to 
productive innovations (Hodgkin, 2007). Humanitarian education actors innovate by introducing 
teaching pedagogies, implementing teacher trainings, and adopting inclusive approaches in many 
camp situations (for example, Oh & Van der Stouwe, 2008).  
The previous section demonstrated that over the course of a PRS, education is shaped by 
negotiations among camp administrators, humanitarian agencies, the host country, the 
international refugee regime, and refugees. The following section will show how this balance is 
jeopardized in the context of resettlement. The case study is based on empirical research in nine 
PRS camps on the Thai–Burmese border.  
 
<A>Methods 
During 2006, the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand 
(CCSDPT), a consortium of NGOs that work along the Thai–Burmese border, commissioned a 
study to comprehensively review resettlement of the camp residents and its impact on the 
services to the remaining population. Serving as the lead consultant to that project, I conducted 
both qualitative and quantitative research. A comprehensive and diverse range of stakeholders 
were interviewed to determine the impact of resettlement, in all nine refugee camps, in 
community-based organizations (CBOs) along the border, and from every CCSDPT NGO, 
totaling 124 interviews and committee meetings. Statistical data were obtained from UNHCR on 
the number of educated/skilled/experienced people in each camp and the numbers of those who 
had already begun the resettlement process. From NGO and CBO staff, information was 
  
garnered on the numbers required to run camp programs and services. Analysis of this data 
compared available skilled staff versus those expected to be necessary in the coming years. 
<A>Refugees on the Thai–Burmese Border 
Ethnic conflict and an authoritarian regime in Burma1 have produced one of the world’s longest 
and most prominent PRS. Refugees from Burma established settlements on the Thai–Burmese 
border beginning in 1984, when the country’s ethnic minorities, fleeing massive human rights 
violations in Burma, crossed into Thailand and remained there past previously seasonal stays. 
Over time, these settlements turned into bona fide refugee camps. Of the nine refugee camps on 
the border recognized by UNHCR, seven are predominantly ethnic Karen, and two are 
predominantly ethnic Karenni. The most recent statistics place the camp population of these nine 
refugee camps at nearly 140,000 (TBBC, 2011, p. 7). 
The comprehensive refugee-led leadership that manages all aspects of camp life from security to 
food distribution in these camps is well known in the humanitarian aid community and has been 
noted as “quite different” from other initial refugee populations (TBBC, 2004, p. 19). These 
governance dynamics replicated the social structures that existed in ethnic communities in 
Burma and also reflect the agenda of resistance movements, foremost among these the well-
known Karen National Union (Horstmann, 2011). In the education sector particularly, education 
is coordinated by the Karen Education Department (KED) in seven camps and the Karenni 
Education Department (KnED) in two camps. These centrally administered organizations 
represent the education departments of the exiled Karen and Karenni governments, respectively 
(Oh & Van der Stouwe, 2008). The vast majority of teachers and administrators are refugees 
themselves, and although Thai law does not easily permit refugees to work for international 
NGOs, education leaders from the camps do coordinate closely with them. ZOA refugee care has 
  
overseen the work of education in the seven Karen camps since 1997; Jesuit Refugee Service 
(JRS) has coordinated the activities of KnED in a similar fashion for the same duration. 
Crucially, the organizations’ significant efforts to empower refugee camp populations to educate 
themselves has had the unintended consequence of making the education sector more vulnerable 
during a time of reduced donor aid and resettlement, as we will see next.  
On the Thai–Burmese border, the lack of mobility in and out of the refugee camps that 
characterizes camp semi-closed systems is not a constant. Over the years, refugees’ ability to exit 
the camps, and non-refugees’ ability to enter them, have varied considerably, depending on 
bilateral relations between Burma and Thailand, border skirmishes, and the personality of local 
officials in camp areas (see K. Johnson, this volume). As one agency worked noted, “When the 
palat (local district officer) is difficult, moving people or supplies in and out of the camps is 
difficult” (interview, April 2007). Although the fences that straddle the borders of most camps 
have holes through which refugees can climb, being found outside the camps makes one subject 
to fines and imprisonment. 
In this context, educational aid organizations like ZOA and JRS serve to support a nearly 
autonomous education system. They mitigate the problem of a limited supply of teachers and 
administrators by offering educator workshops and they bring in volunteer teachers, in effect 
increasing the supply of educators in the camps. They administer camp passes and have 
negotiated, with the help of the Thai Ministry of Education, for students to be able to move from 
camp to camp to study in different schools, thus helping in part to address the issue of limited 
student mobility. Their provision of supplies, books, and small stipends for the teachers injects 
the education system with important resources (Oh, 2006; Oh & van der Stouwe, 2008). 
Humanitarian agencies have also been at the forefront of innovative programming both inside the 
  
camps, where they have introduced teacher colleges and programs for the disabled, for example, 
and outside of them, where they have negotiated with the Ministry of Education to manage the 
conflicting needs of migrants and the security considerations of the Ministry of the Interior (K. 
Johnson, this volume). 
 
<B>The Impact of Resettlement 
Starting in late 2005, UNHCR began a program of mass resettlement from the camps to several 
resettlement countries of the global North. The reasons for the launch of the resettlement 
program have been detailed elsewhere and point to shifting strategic priorities of the 
international refugee regime (Banki & Lang, 2008). This chapter focuses on the impact of 
resettlement on the education sector. Although the chapter draws on research conducted in 
March to May of 2007, when the resettlement program was in its early stages and only 5,500 
refugees had been resettled, recent reports suggest that, after 65,000 have been resettled, 
challenges continue (TBBC, 2010, p. 8). 
Despite an evolved system of primary, secondary, and post-10 (i.e., last two years of high 
school) education in the camps, the pursuit of higher education remains difficult for broad swaths 
of camp residents. Ironically, this lack of education is one of the primary reasons why members 
of the educated population are seeking resettlement—to pursue better educational opportunities 
for themselves and their children. And it is part of the reason why maintaining the quality of the 
current education programs is so important. 
 
<B>Depletion of Skilled Workers 
  
The primary challenge for the education of remaining populations is the depletion of teachers 
and administrators in the camps. In systemic terms, the semi-closed nature of camps changes as 
refugees leave permanently, because those who depart are proportionately the better educated 
(Banki & Lang, 2007). Three primary reasons explain the depletion of educated residents from 
the camps. First, the educated want to resettle in higher percentages than the total camp 
population. In 2007, UNHCR data revealed that 38% of the entire camp population had 
expressed an interest in resettlement, whereas 61% of the post-10th grade population had (Banki 
& Lang, 2007).  
Second, UNHCR’s resettlement criteria generally follow a ‘first-in, first-out’ procedure, wherein 
refugees who arrived in Thailand first are among the first to be submitted by UNHCR to 
resettlement countries. In general, those who have been in the camps longer are generally better 
educated than those who arrived later: in the camps, children have access to school every day, 
whereas in the jungles in Burma, education of schoolchildren frequently fleeing their villages is 
clearly more of a challenge. Thus the ‘first-in, first-out’ rule gives the educated the opportunity 
to resettle first.  
Third, some resettlement countries emphasize the importance of integration potential in selecting 
candidates for resettlement. In these instances, the fact that the skilled apply in higher 
proportions, and are sometimes submitted in higher proportions, is compounded by the fact that 
some resettlement countries accept the skilled in higher proportions. Thus, although only 7.7% of 
the total camp population had been accepted for resettlement in 2007, 19.6% of the post-10th 
grade population had been accepted (Banki & Lang, 2007, p. 6). 
 
<C>Effects on Educators 
  
In the camp education sector, where many of the most experienced and educated refugees 
worked, the depletion of a skilled work force had a strong impact. In this semi-closed system, 
few skilled workers have arrived to replace those who resettled. And because the humanitarian 
system for decades was understandably built around the premise of empowering refugees to 
address the limited supply of teachers within the camps, the exit of this supply—in fact a severe 
form of “brain drain”—makes it doubly difficult to find adequate replacements. The decrease in 
the supply of students does mean that fewer classes altogether are required for the education 
sector, but this decrease is not commensurate with the decrease in teachers. Furthermore, mass 
resettlement also leads to a decrease in demand, both in numbers and in terms of motivation.  
In the nine camps along the Thai–Burmese border, the education sector employs more camp 
refugees than any other sector by far. Altogether, teachers, principals, teacher trainers, educators 
in schools, special education, post-10, vocational training, non-formal education, and other 
associated staff comprised about half of all camp workers (3,400 of 7,000 in 2007). Even early in 
the resettlement process in 2007, it was clear that educators were seeking to resettle or had 
already departed in disproportionate numbers to the rest of the population. In one camp, 130 out 
of 131 educators had applied for resettlement. In another, 9% of the teachers had departed, 
whereas only 2% of the general population had done so. In two other camps, the entire staffs of 
education NGOs had departed. And in another camp, a teaching college that traditionally 
prepared students to become the next wave of camp teachers had witnessed a 75% drop in 
enrolment (Banki & Lang, 2007, p. 9).  
Thus the departure of teachers from the camps represents an outflow of skilled refugees, who, in 
a semi-closed system, are difficult to replace. Because teachers receive lower remuneration than 
  
other NGO workers, over time, losses in other sectors compound the losses in the education 
sector, as skilled teachers move into other jobs (such as into the health sector). 
Of equal concern is the loss of supervisors, school principals, and other long-serving education 
staff. These are individuals who have been trained in curriculum development, classroom 
management, and school supervision. The loss of personnel who can provide educational 
guidance heightens the problem of losing long-serving teachers, influencing the quality of 
monitoring and training. One NGO staff member observed that when one of the post-10 camp 
schools lost its principal halfway through the school year, the associated NGOs and CBOs spent 
the remainder of the year “trying to play catch up. Basically we never recovered” (interview, 
April 12, 2007). 
The difficulty of replacing education staff members who resettle has been confirmed by more 
recent studies of the camp education sector. Although new camp entrants have been able to fill 
some education roles, the fact that the camps were semi-closed for so long means that the 
teaching culture is difficult to adapt to at present, and the “systems, schedules, values and 
philosophy of the schools are easily destabilized” (Oh, 2010, p. 122).  
 
<C>Effects on Students 
For refugee students, resettlement represents the greatest possible opportunity for mobility and 
change. The effects of this potential are manifold and contradictory. On the one hand, students 
(even those ‘left behind’ who hope eventually to be resettled) have a sense of anticipation and 
excitement at the prospect of rebuilding their lives and obtaining citizenship. On the other hand, 
both resettling and non-resettling students are distracted to the point of losing attention. 
“Resettlement is all the students talk about,” noted one Mae La camp educator (interview, April 
  
27, 2007). The head of the Karen Education Department (KED) noted that in several schools in 
the seven Karen camps, exam scores from 2005 to 2007 were lower than ever before. This 
change may be attributed to several key factors linked to resettlement: students lose their focus; 
teachers have less experience, which affects classroom management and instruction; control and 
discipline worsens in the classroom; supervisors are less capable of communicating daily 
problems; and fellowship within the teaching community suffers. Some resettling staff members 
are also distracted by their life to come, losing interest in their work or doing it half-heartedly, 
and remaining staff members experience a loss of morale as they have to work harder to fill the 
gaps while witnessing the departure of friends and colleagues. Overall, the quality of schooling 
suffers. 
Finally, students are among the many refugees affected by the “to resettle or not to resettle” 
debate, which reflects ideological differences among the population about the value of 
resettlement versus remaining near Burma to maintain cultural ties and advocate for regime 
change. This roughly mirrors the kinds of debates in which refugees in other settings engage in 
the context of discussing education. As Buck and Silver (this volume) note, “traditional” and 
“enlightened” discourses use schools and educational programs as their fighting ground; 
similarly refugees who use education as the reason for resettling are pitted against those who 
want to remain and retain traditional ethnic values. In interviews, camp and non-camp staff, as 
well as refugee families, generally acknowledged that the desire to resettle divides families along 
age lines, with older, more traditional members of the family eager to remain near Burma, 
whereas younger, English-speaking, global North-leaning youth are enthusiastic about resettling.  
 
<C>Effects on Capital 
  
At the time that research for the CCSDPT study was commissioned, it was too early to measure 
effects on the flows of resources into or out of the camp education sector. However NGOs were 
already anticipating that their own funding sources would diminish as the numbers in the refugee 
camps began to decrease as more refugees resettled. Discussions among educators included a 
consideration that international NGOs might eventually withdraw, leaving refugee staff to 
fundraise, administer trainings, and continue to work without the small stipends refugee 
educators have until now received. “That’s like asking public school teachers to worry about the 
sustainability of their schools when they are working with no salaries,” noted one participant in 
the discussion (committee meeting, May 9, 2007). 
With respect to capital flows, no empirical research has measured the current effect of informal 
market activities and remittances into the camps, but it can be safely said that humanitarian 
agencies represent a significant source of funding in the camps. It is logical that in the absence, 
or decline, of such funding, the education sector would suffer. As noted by ZOA’s 2009 Annual 
Report,  
 
There is little chance that the local, community level organisations will reach the 
point of self-reliance when assessed against the political environment in which 
they find themselves. They are almost entirely dependent on support from non-
governmental organisations for their mere existence, let alone to manage an 
education programme. (p. 40) 
 
In fact, although funding to some organizations has decreased with the advent of mass 
resettlement, it is not possible to pin this effect solely on resettlement. Donor fatigue along the 
border is an issue (South, 2011, p. 41), and in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, a great many 
humanitarian aid organizations began to devote greater resources to supporting communities 
  
inside Burma while refugee funding was withdrawn (Saw Yan Naing, 2009). The education 
sector has been affected along with others; for example, since 2008, ZOA Thailand has been 
planning its handover to the Thailand-based U-sa Khanae Development Foundation. 
 
<C>Effects on the Education System and Curriculum 
The capacity building approach adopted by education NGOs and CBOs along the Thai–Burmese 
border was designed with repatriation in mind, specifically to empower refugees to conduct their 
own trainings, monitoring, and reporting. This very approach now makes the education system 
more vulnerable to decline, because many of the trainers and supervisors who took over for 
expatriate and/or national staff some years ago are now seeking resettlement, and there are few 
expatriate and national staff to fill these roles.  
In the present context of resettlement, some education content has shifted to resettling 
populations. For example, ZOA offers some vocational training specifically to help individuals 
find jobs in third countries, and has started a nonformal English program (English language for 
adults), which, although open to the whole adult population, has resettlement-focused content. 
Although these programs are needed for the resettling population, the programs affect the 
resources of the remaining population because there is such a limited supply of educators. Thus, 
even if programs for resettling refugees are supported through different funding streams, their 
existence can sap the labor resources that were previously devoted to the entire camp population. 
  
 
<A>Conclusion 
This chapter has noted the ways that international humanitarian agencies respond to and mitigate 
the semi-closed systems that characterize refugee camps. In the refugee camp education sector, 
strategies include training camp resident educators to increase supply, improving access to the 
camps through administrative aid, providing much needed resources, and developing curricula. 
Although these strategies are logical and function to improve education in PRS refugee camps, in 
situations of mass resettlement, these same strategies can have adverse consequences as skilled 
workers are depleted from the camps, large numbers of refugees and associated humanitarian aid 
exit rapidly, and the priorities of major stakeholders shift. 
These findings are not meant to criticize the resettlement option. Resettlement of refugees 
represents a critical durable solution, and UNHCR has called on the international community to 
increase its resettlement numbers annually (UNHCR, 2011). However, this chapter does suggest 
that the nature of camps’ semi-closed systems, and the strategies that are developed to respond to 
them, ought to be considered when thinking about the impact of mass resettlement on the 
education of those left behind. On the Thai–Burmese border, camp refugees continue to be 
educated, and “services have not collapsed … due in combination to the resilience of the strong 
community structures and the willingness of NGOs to respond to the new challenges” (TBBC, 
2010, p. 8). Nevertheless, the shift has posed significant challenges. Hopefully, resettlement will 
continue to encourage the resilience that humanitarian agencies and the refugees themselves have 
utilized to adapt to semi-closed systems in the first place. 
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i The southeast Asian country of Burma is called Myanmar by the current government. The 
majority of the border-based organizations, however, continue to refer to the country as Burma. 
